phenomenon with no measurable deviation from a regime's baseline norms or rule of law. Non-compliance is empirically much more evident, as deviation from these established patterns. The question is reducible to one of measuring deviations from an authoritarian regime's rule of law, and discerning the causes of these deviations.
Scholars who value formal evidence of institutional inefficiency might seek, instead of measuring behavioral compliance by actors external to the institutions, to measure institutional performance itself. In other words, they might seek a means of directly assessing the institutional "slack" available for authoritarian manipulation, or, with reference to the specific institutions under consideration, the amount of electoral fraud committed even under Mexico's reformed electoral system. While direct evidence of electoral fraud is ample in anecdotal cases, it is much easier to cite incidents of fraud than to aggregate them into any meaningful sum of the effects of this elusive phenomenon. Suspicious electoral trends (such as a 100 percent vote for the Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] in districts where there are three candidates), blatant incidents of crooked election day ballottallying and flagrant campaign overspending are the talk of Mexican politics,2 and such testimonials from participants in negotiations to subvert the electoral "will of the people" to pre-negotiated outcomes offer compelling evidence in isolated cases. However, as also found by other researchers seeking to quantify electoral fraud (Choe, 1997; Molina and Lehoucq, 1998; Sadek, 1995) , it is easy to suspect, and difficult to verify. One solution, and the one undertaken in this article, is to accept that institutional failure may be measured by a less direct but more accurate indicator: actor compliance with the institutions. The result may be less micro-analytically rigorous than a hypothetical direct measure of institutional inefficiency (in the form of electoral fraud), but it is a much more tractable research strategy. This is an electoral politics study, but unlike other studies of elections it does not assume the official electoral results to be the final outcome. It argues that in the Mexican case during the protracted transition, such standard approaches miss many of the strategic interactions yielding post-electoral results, which in many cases vary from the outcome of the actual election. I directly compare the difference between "legal" and "extra-legal" post-electoral resolutions by contrasting these outcomes in a representative sample of municipal elections in 14 of Mexico's states over three local electoral cycles (spanning 1989-1992, 1992-1994, and 1995-1998) . I demonstrate a dramatic decrease in the number of post-electoral conflicts and a concurrent increase in the utilization of electoral courts; but the transformation is not linear, and it is not due solely to any increase in the strength and autonomy of the state electoral institutions themselves.3 Rather, I argue that it is actors' decisions to comply with these formal "parchment" electoral institutions, based on self-interest calculations, which determine whether they are actually used. Without actor compliance, particularly by the opposition, the institutional strength of an electoral court is an empty cup, no matter how much it brims over with potential. This is not a trivial point, but it is one which is constantly taken for granted in the literature on "pacted transitions," where the time differential between the creation of institutions and compliance with them is sufficiently small so that these two separate steps are conflated into one by most observers.
Obviously, electoral courts and party compliance with them are far from the only institutions important to the increasing electoral competitiveness of opposition parties and their acceptance of the regime's liberalizing "rules of the game." Reforms mandating greater opposition through proportional representation, increased transparency of the electoral lists and balloting stations, the creation of a more plural and autonomous national electoral commission (and subsequent reforms in the states), and limits on campaign contributions and media exposure have all positively impacted on parties' decisions to participate in the process, and to "run to win" rather than just running to bargain for a consolation prize later. In fact, the electoral court reforms were among the last of these electoral reforms. However, acceptance or contestation of their rulings remains the single best proxy for whether the opposition accepts the "bundle" of practices represented by the official results. Hence, this work focuses on the endpoint of the electoral decision tree, rather than looking higher up the process for institutional violations of freedom and fairness.
The broader point, that opposition party participation in electoral institutions leads to these parties' acceptance of the electoral rules, reflects not just on the courts themselves, but on electoral institutions more broadly. Institutions matter certainly, but so does the "demand side"-opposition parties' acceptance of them. This fundamental point was lost in the exemplar pacted transitions,4 as they proceeded so quickly that it was impossible to disaggregate them into component processes. After the smoke cleared in these transitions, actors were either "in the system" and compliant, or "outside the system" and rebellious. Democracy was a matter of maintaining a ruling coalition with more "ins" than "outs."
I now consider four means through which the authoritarian incumbent retained control over the adjudication of Mexico's local post-electoral disputes at the height of its protracted transition .5 I seek to discern how the authoritarian incumbents of the PRI sought to construct mechanisms to placate the "outs" without sacrificing the power of the "ins." It was a precarious balance the PRI-state sought, and one which ultimately eluded them. But the regime's ability to navigate this fine line-and researchers' ability now to measure itprovides rich material for scholars of electoral institutions.
Rise of Mexico's Opposition and Rule of Law
Great strides have been made over the last decade at Mexico's federal level in making elections credible. Progress at the state and local levels has come much more slowly, as some of the state-level institutions created for administering elections have tended to function much better on paper than in practice. Indeed, characteristic of Mexico's protracted democratic transition, local PRI political machines remain strong and their influence on ostensibly non-partisan electoral institutions continues, even after the opposition National Action Party (PAN) won the presidency in 2000, prompting the first executive branch alternation in over seventy years. In the states, expensive6 and autonomous electoral institutions have been largely ignored when they are most needed, in resolving post-electoral conflicts. Instead of submitting legal complaints to electoral courts, opposition parties and authoritarian incumbents consistently negotiated extra-legal bargains to resolve post-electoral conflicts which occurred in some 13 percent of all of Mexico's local elections between 1988 and 2001.
Since the 1940s, the PRI encouraged the existence of "cosmetic" opposition through the appropriation of proportional representation seats in congress which helped mask the one-party state's authoritarian grip. As a result of the 1977 electoral reforms which further promoted opposition participation and the widespread 1982 economic crisis, the opposition, and particularly the rightist PAN, actually started to win local elections with regularity. The PRI-state, caught off guard, reneged on its commitments of "moral [and electoral] renovation," and refused to honor victories by the PAN and more isolated social/electoral movements by the incipient left, starting in the early 1980s.
Business leaders who had been charter members of the PRI-state's coalition grew disenchanted with the government in the face of bank nationalizations, the international debt crisis, and profligate public spending, and exited the party in favor of the previously genteel opposition of PAN. After the conservative opposition spent its first 45 years patiently proposing gradual reforms, a new generation of PAN activists in the 1980s demanded deeper changes, and complemented the party's platform of gradualism and debate with more impatient demands, accompanied by anti-election fraud mobilizations and civil disobedience. However, the party developed a "patronage-seeking" imperative which contradicted its more radical "transition-seeking" objective. A pattern developed whereby the PAN mobilized after losing fraudulent elections only to be silenced by concessions from the PRI-state in exchange for silent complicity.7 The practice, known as concertacesion (Mexican slang for "concert" plus "concession") also gained currency on the left, which was much less successful at negotiating with the authoritarian regime. The nascent leftist parties of the early 1980s launched segunda vuelta ("second time around") mobilizations-to win through mobilization elections not recognized at the polls.
The disciplined PAN'S combination of legal and extra-legal contestation strategies pioneered the move to "juridicize" electoral accountability, starting in the 1940s.8 Ironically, however, the PAN'S concurrent ventures into civil disobedience and extra-legal mobilization, culminating in the extended strikes and hunger strikes of the Chihuahua 1986 governor's race, also provided a precedent for the left's most successful extra-legal mobilization ever, after the fraudulent presidential election of 1988. Indeed, the PAN served the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) as a model of sympathy-grabbing post-electoral conduct rather than the tiny parastatal and leftist parties which comprised the pre-1988 left.
PRD activists walked the post-electoral conflict gauntlet in 1988,9 before their candidate backed down from the brink of undermining the regime's stability in protest. Contrary to the PAN'S principled civil disobedience coupled with behindthe-scenes negotiating with the PRI-state, the PRD's pattern of post-electoral mobilization was usually spontaneous rather than coordinated, local rather than national, and boundless rather than controlled. In the 1980s, the PAN stepped up its shows of discontent with the regime, as did the leftist parties which in 1989 merged with leftist PRI dissidents into the PRD. The decade-long period considered in this work (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) represents the zenith of post-electoral negotiating, but also the launching of functional electoral courts in most states. Both opposition parties' efforts to "win" consolation posts at the bargaining table prompted a contradictory PRI-state policy of acquiescence and granting of extra-legal spoils while simultaneously constructing a regime of electoral courts autonomous of the executive branch, at least on paper.
Clearly, in the late 1980s and early 1990s there were two separate and divergent focal points of actor expectations. The first was that of the informal bargaining tables, where the opposition parties sought to extract what they could from the regime, and the PRi-state sought to fill the demands they could meet without jeopardizing control of the regime-controlled electoral opening. The second was the convergence of expectations around the regime's nascent, but utterly biased formal electoral institutions. Here, the authoritarian incumbents sought to channel post-electoral contestation through electoral institutions, which were intended, at least in the most blatant cases, to diffuse tempers while adhering to the PRI-state's pre-determined outcomes, whether executed by the governor or the federal secretary of the interior. In addition to these cases of judicial failure, electoral courts existed which worked according to social norms; that is, they adjudicated post-electoral disputes to the satisfaction of the parties and prevented these disagreements from "spilling over" into street demonstrations and violence.
The opposition parties felt compelled to at least pay lip service to the formal institutions, as a post-electoral protocol for informal negotiations with the PRI-state required the opposition to have tried and failed through institutional routes first (Lopez Obrador and Martinez interviews). By a similar logic, PRI-state officials claimed that they had no choice but to perpetuate the granting of post-electoral concessions as the only way to keep the heightened expectations of the opposition parties at bay and prevent them from fomenting ungovernability or even violence.10 How could this dual cycle of high expectations from extra-legal bargaining and low expectations from legal proceedings be broken? When did the PRI-state and its opposition stop manipulating the courts and actually use them, and when did these actors stop manipulating the post-electoral bargaining tables and disband them? The legal and extra-legal routes to post-electoral conflict resolution started to diverge in the early to mid-1990s, but only after Mexico's weak rule of law suffered several years of direct competition between these two focal points.
The following section seeks to typify the behavior of electoral courts during the period between creation and compliance by classifying electoral courts into the five ideal types based on their adjudication records. However, before proceeding, I specify the proper time-frame for these observations by devising a revealing indicator of electoral court success or failure (again in political rather than juridical terms), the "rule of law ratio," presented in Tables 1, 2 , and 3. This ratio, the total number of PAN/PRD post-electoral conflicts per municipality divided by the number of PAN/PRD court cases filed per municipality, offers a rough but vivid indicator of whether the law was followed and allows us to identify the gap between creation and compliance as that of greatest flux. The ratio, which approaches the threshold of full compliance by actors with the electoral courts as its value approaches zero, drops by half from 1.33 to 0.6 between the two initial periods under study, and then falls even more precipitously, from 0.6 to 0.2, between the second and third periods.
During T1, the first period, for every four post-electoral conflicts there were only three court complaints filed. A compelling case is made for the primacy of mobilizations over sole recourse to the courts. This T1 and T2 tendency to place street demonstrations ahead of court complaints changes dramatically during T3 (where the ratio falls to 0.2), when it may be said that opposition parties came to abide by the institutions, with relatively few exceptions.
One compelling reason for the drastic decrease in the T3 rule-of-law ratios may be that the federal electoral court, largely considered autonomous and fair since 1994 (Eisenstadt, n.d.: chap. 5), was granted constitutional authority as an appeals chamber for state post-electoral disputes in 1996. Indeed, state legislators throughout Mexico are still homogenizing their electoral laws with federal 1. There were no complaints turned in on time, but after the deadline 14 complaints were filed. 2. The conclusion that the Chiapas 1991 and Michoacan 1989 electoral courts described in the electoral law did not by political parties and later electoral judges that they had not heard of the courts, and on surveys of at least two p months following the election. 3. Unlike the other cases, precise data on the number of municipalities contested by each party was unavailable, eve aggregate data of all case filings by each party in the 1991 municipal races published in the Dictamen de Veracruz ne 4. The 1.33 "rule of law" ratio results from dividing the overall total number of conflicts by the known number of co conflicts but only in states where court complaint totals are known (N=8) yields a "rule of law" ratio of 0.70. The r between these extremes, call it 1.02 (averaging these two extremes). Note. For explanation of selection and coding, see Eisenstadt (1998, 341-343 
Ideal Types of Judicial Failure
Just as the ideal of electoral justice was gaining currency after notorious electoral frauds in several mid-1980s gubernatorial elections and the 1988 presidential election fiasco, states started to catch up with evolution in federal electoral law. Lagging the federal electoral reforms of 1986 by between two and ten years, at least 16 of the 31 states had legislated the existence of electoral courts by 1989. By 1996 all had electoral courts, and in approximately half of them, electoral college certification had been replaced by electoral institution judicial certification (Crespo, 1996: 114-128 ). However, the introduction of electoral courts was not immediately accompanied by the expected reduction in post-electoral conflicts. A standard "institutional strength" argument would ask how autonomous the electoral court was from the executive branch, assuming that the more independent the institution, the greater the likelihood it would succeed in channeling post-electoral conflicts through judicial institutions. However, as shown by a tally of post-electoral conflicts recorded between 1989 and 1994 in 14 states, the number of these conflicts was not immediately reduced as electoral courts were reformed and fortified.
The number of post-electoral conflicts did drop dramatically during the last three-year period analyzed (1995-1998), but I argue that this was due directly to opposition party decisions to comply with electoral institutions, however imperfect, rather than continuing to resort to concertacesiones and the segunda vuelta. The institutions themselves were significant, but more because of the potential they represented for resolving disputes equitably, should all parties have chosen to use them, than as ends unto themselves. They did not serve as "face value" deterrents to electoral fraud, and in fact, during the period intermediate between the construction of electoral courts and when they were imbued with credibility, the courts actually stimulated post-electoral conflicts-at least by the PRD-adding one more informal bargaining table to the post-electoral process. The increase in post-electoral conflicts between the first and second periods confirmed that opposition parties' strategies vis-a-vis the institutions were critical, and that the parchment strength of these institutions was only one of several determinants of these strategies.
In addition to constructing quantitative measures of compliance with electoral courts, this article seeks to make qualitative assessments. I classify the four most common forms of electoral court failure (as well as characterizing a fifth residual category, "working courts"), and illustrate each from the 14-state sample, arguing that if electoral court success is defined as the channeling of all conflicts through legal (as opposed to extra-legal) routes, then failure must be measured in terms of the number of post-electoral conflicts and not by reference to a random indicator of electoral court performance isolated from the social-political purposes of these institutions. The four ideal types of unsuccessful state electoral courts to be discussed in turn are: "clipped courts," overruled by other governmental actors, mainly the state legislature acting as an electoral college; "phantom courts," ignored by all other actors (those in government and those in the opposition parties) to such an extent that parties do not even bother filing complaints; "whitewash courts," which succumb to informal executive branch pressures for verdicts to legalize informal bargains; and "paper shuffling courts," inaccessible to political party complainants because their excessively formalistic and rigorous procedures lead them to summarily reject all complaints. A fifth type is the "working courts," whose legally based but uneventful rulings are not attended by drama, intrigue, or extra-institutional challenges, but which are the only ones serving the public interest of electoral justice rather than the particularistic interest of political actors.
Clipped Courts. This class of electoral court failure, characterized by the overruling of verdicts by the state's electoral college (usually under orders from the governor, or the federal secretariat of the interior), or, in its lesser form, by legislative decree of the formation of a municipal council in a conflictive municipality, was by far the most common in my sample. Since public records exist of most (but not all) of these acts of institutional disregard for judicial verdicts, they could be easily researched. As the most "legal" means for the PRI-state to deny opposition victories, by acknowledging the substitution of political for legal criteria in decision making (but fully within the law), this was the authoritarian incumbent's choice for overturning adverse electoral results-at least from the early days of RI consolidation in the 1930s and 1940s, through the mid-1990s, when PRI legislative majorities were lost for the first time in several states, and electoral colleges were reformed out of most state electoral laws. Clipped courts almost always benefited the PAN at the expense of the national PRI. Cases in this category include: Sonora 1991, YucatAn 1990, and Yucatan 1993.
The most intriguing case in my entire sample, the 1993 Yucatan electoral court, would have been a whitewash court had it complied with federal PRI-state orders to revoke the PRI'S M6rida mayoral victory, and granted it to the PAN. However, the electoral court refused to betray the local PRI, even after the national PRI-state flew the electoral magistrates to Mexico City to put pressure on them, and the concertacesion had to be cleansed through the legislature's PRI-ista majority electoral college, which did dutifully reverse the clipped court's verdict, while attracting extensive adverse publicity in the process. Phantom Courts. While less common than the clipped courts, this is the most dramatic type. It represents courts codified in electoral laws, but which do not exist in practice, at least not in any form known to electoral law specialists from electoral institutions or the political parties. The most dramatic example is the Zacatecas electoral court which was presented with no cases in the 1992 local elections, while 32 disputes were taken directly to the electoral college for adjudication (Zacatecas Electoral Commission, 1992: 35, 38).l3 The opposition parties held the powers of this institution in such low esteem that they did not even bother using it.
A Whitewash Courts. This form of institutional failure covers cases in which state and/or federal executives intervene in the certification of local elections by imposing their wills on electoral courts, which then "cleanse" electoral fraud through legal institutions. However, as may be imagined, when executive interference occurred prior to the electoral court ruling, the agreements were made in smoke-filled rooms rather than on the public record. Hence, verifying the existence of such informal pacts to "legalize" electoral improprieties is an understandably delicate exercise. First-hand interviews, but only if corroborated by at least one other source from a party or political institution or a reliable journalistic account, were used to confirm the status of whitewash courts. This type of institutional failure is no doubt underrepresented in my sample, and in the public record generally. Party activists constantly decried the existence of such arrangements, particularly between the PAN and the PRI, but could rarely substantiate allegations except when they intercepted and taped the cellular phone conversations of whitewashing operatives or when a negotiator reneged afterwards and publicized the deal-making episode to damage an opponent's reputation (and frequently his own in the process).
Like the clipped courts, the few whitewash courts which have been exposed were mostly commissioned by the national PRI-state to sanitize local PAN victories, in places like Nuevo Le6n 1994 (the Monterrey mayor's race), although they are also used in Michoacain 1992 to defuse seven post-electoral conflicts with the PRD. Although these are the only whitewash courts verified in my sample, whitewash courts would be preferred by the PRi-state to clipped courts, which publicly expose the inconsistencies between the judicial and political verdicts to the detriment of each institution's credibility. Whitewash courts delivered the authoritarian incumbent's desired outcome without the adverse publicity generated by the clipped courts.
Paper Shuffling Courts. This is the only category of electoral court failure that represents institutional breakdown due to causes internal to the court rather than to pressures exogenous to that institution.'8 In these cases, complaints filed by any political parties are summarily dismissed for procedural reasons, before their arguments are even considered by the magistrates. The court may decide to summarily reject most or all cases for legally-grounded reasons. "Legality" within a narrow procedural definition is not at issue; what is being questioned is flexibility of magistrates in assuring political parties access to electoral justice and the very nature of these rigid laws which preclude election losers from settling their disputes in court. While the lack of preparation and even the filing of "bad faith" complaints by political parties must also be addressed, the electoral court's objective of reducing social conflicts by channeling them off the streets and into the courtroom is obstructed in paper shuffling courts by excessively regimented laws and/or inflexible magistrates.
Paper shuffling courts occurred twice in my local election sample: in 1992 Jalisco (where all 63 complaints were rejected) and in 1995 Chiapas (68 complaints rejected).l9 This sample would have been much larger had I used criteria more broadly based (such as electoral courts where most but not all of the cases were rejected, say more than 80 percent, given the average federal electoral court rejection rate of approximately 55 percent over four federal electoral processes), or by considering the rate of ballot box annulments resulting from "founded" verdicts in those cases which were accepted for full consideration (approaching an average of 4 percent at the federal level between 1988 and 1997). However, by selecting on a much narrower basis (only electoral courts which rejected all cases), I present only the starkest examples, which I believe are beyond question even by electoral experts, some of whom admitted privately that the paper shuffling courts are confounding their broader social-political objectives.
Courts versus Bargaining Tables
The 14 states incorporated within the sample were selected to assure broad variation in levels of post-electoral conflict (see Table 4 ). Two states selected were among the highest number of post-electoral conflicts (Chiapas and Michoacan where these occurred in as many as 40 percent of the local races during the time period studied), as were several states with among the lowest incidence of postelectoral conflicts (Campeche, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and Tlaxcala, with postelectoral conflicts in fewer than 5 percent of the polls). Variation was also sought to include geographical dispersion, a mix of rural and urban states, and a range of electoral competition between the PRI and the opposition. As demonstrated in Table 4 , the series of electoral races considered in each state was that of the reform-introducing institutions of post-electoral conflict resolution (the electoral court founding or "second stage") as well as the election prior to this institutional innovation, and the race immediately after this change. (Table 4) .21 These electoral courts were not always fully independent-as they often relied on the governor for nomination; but at least by the second period of study they could be considered sufficiently independent to be courts, rather than just administrative agencies. As shown in Table 1 , courts existed in some states during the first-period, but with a highly subordinate status. All of the first period courts possessed the authority to suggest resolutions to the electoral college, but in no case could they impose resolutions with the weight of law. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 classify the electoral courts in my sample according to my four typologies of electoral court failure. In the first period, only 3 of the 14 states possessed working courts, and with the caveat that none of the 1989-1992 electoral courts possessed outright legal authority. By the second period, all the courts were at least partially independent of the legislature's electoral college by definition (in some cases the electoral court could still be overruled, but only by a qualified majority of the legislature), as I selected to ensure that the second period represented the initiation of more autonomous electoral courts. By the second period, 10 of the 14 courts "worked," based on analysis of their case records, protagonist interviews, and secondary sources. Notably, there was only one case of regression, the Nuevo Le6n court's reversion from "working" status in 1991 to "whitewash" court institutional failure in 1994. Otherwise, a clear but slow progression toward "working courts" is evident.
Two other observations from the classification of electoral courts, but not presented in Tables 1-3 above, are worth stating. The first is that by T3, the PRI filed electoral court complaints in more municipalities than did the PAN or PRD, while in TI (again based on data from only five states), and T2, the PRD filed them in more cities than the PAN or PRI. This trend indicates not only that the opposition parties came to take electoral courts more seriously, but also that, as a consequence, the PRI had to start defending its vote judicially, rather than just resorting to the old ways of electoral corruption. The second trend indicative of increasing credibility of electoral institutions as well as of increasing competition between parties, is that T1 electoral court complaints were overwhelmingly to contest mayoral and gubernatorial races, while by T3, the legal contestation of legislative and city council races, to challenge proportional representation as well as uninominal seats, was also common.22
Upon specifying the crucial period between creation and compliance through construction of a rule-of-law ratio approaching zero, as actors increasingly accepted electoral court verdicts without challenging them in street demonstrations, this article was able to focus on the types of electoral institution failure characterizing this limbo period. The burden of phantom court failures may fall on the political parties, who did not even bother to use them, regardless of whether there existed indicators that filing cases to them would be a waste of scarce resources. The other three types of electoral court failure were largely due to abuses by the party-state. The clipped and paper shuffling courts provided legal justifications for discretionary decisions, while the whitewash courts did not even bother to provide such paper trails. While these ideal types of electoral court failure (and the complementary increase in the number of working courts) offer a framework for future comparative research, the broader finding is that the failure ofjudicial institutions can be measured.
Conclusions
This article has sought to demonstrate, in one of the most important but highly specific arenas of transition-the post-electoral bargaining space-that the divergent strategies of the PAN and PRD were instrumental in maintaining pressures for liberalization, while simultaneously collecting sufficient electoral spoils to keep alive their internal aspirations of sharing power. The gradual evolution toward working courts and low rule-of-law ratios (indicating actor compliance with court procedures) does not confirm automatic compliance by the opposition parties with the institutions constructed by the authoritarian incumbents. But it does indicate increasing compliance by the opposition parties (and particularly by the PRD, responsible for some 80 percent of the post-electoral conflicts), which had largely accepted reformed electoral institutions by the third period, and consolidated their own authority sufficiently to prevent freelance post-electoral mobilizations from surfacing in opposition to national party headquarters' policies.
These parties' positions were constantly shifting in response to various factors (covered in Eisenstadt, n.d.), which include the closeness of the margin of their second-place finish (in the case of post-electoral conflicts), the level of party organization in contested election localities, the disposition of potential street demonstrators, or simply the lag-time needed by political parties to learn how to file effective complaints and to become convinced that the electoral courts were worthwhile. Discerning the causes of the post-electoral conflicts is a task for future research. Yet the most significant finding of the present article is that contrary to conventional theories, opposition party compliance with "rules of the game" is far from automatic, even if those rules appear to be equitable. Formal rules are only part of the story. Informal practices, typified here as backroom post-electoral bargaining tables, often illuminate more of actors' behavior than merely reviewing court dockets visible in broad daylight. The dominance of extra-legal bargaining over legal proceedings was predictably evident in my 14-state sample during period one (before the introduction of autonomous electoral courts). However, not so predictably, the dominance of the extra-legal over the legal also prevailed in period two, when the opposition parties exploited both paths of dispute resolution, maximizing their side-payment settlements rather than any norm of electoral justice. Only in period three was the predictable pattern of formal institution dominance over informal bargaining firmly established. These findings have implications for future research both in micro-institutional studies of judicial institutions generally and in macro-level research on democratic transitions.
What of the lag between the creation of electoral courts and compliance with them, the crucial second period, T2? This specification of the period required for the actors to decide to comply is a necessary consideration, one which I assert may be factored into most studies on the transition to a rule of law (separate but often collinear with democratic transitions). Past studies of judicial institutionbuilding and democratization may have failed to formally measure actor compliance for two reasons. They assumed actor compliance because, in the abrupt pacted transitions they studied, such compliance was largely granted by all actors in the elite settlement pact. In addition, there existed no subtle means of measuring partial compliance anyway. Such compliance was all or nothing, like the pacted transition. By establishing a baseline for non-compliance with these judicial institutions, it is possible to measure empirical performance against this standard.
In general, judicial institutions in established rule-of-law polities are difficult to model as political actors. As Gillman appropriately points out (1997: 11), the difference between rational judges adhering to strong individual preferences and those adhering to norms of principled behavior in a set social order is difficult to ascertain. Unlike reelection-maximizing legislators or budget-maximizing bureaucrats, judges tend to be appointed for extended terms and into positions where the resources or discretion available for their maximization defy the parsimonious incentive models of rational politicians. However, in consolidating judiciaries, where judges' gowns may not yet cover executive branch incursions into judicial decision-making, magistrate incentives may still be laid bare, as they were in Mexico's subnational electoral courts in the early 1990s.
Studying pre-consolidation judicial institutions alone is insufficient for getting to the bottom of magistrate motivations, although it is an effective start towards understanding authoritarian courts and those in new democracies. However, a means of empirically measuring the institutional success of the judiciary has yet to be derived. But even if judicial success is unobservable in broad political (as opposed to strictly legal) terms, except as the affected parties' compliance with decisions, there is a way out. This sleight-of-hand measurement technique, defining "working" judicial institutions as those that do not fail, may be feasible only under very specific conditions, where all or most incidents of non-compliance are verifiably manifested. But when such conditions exist, such as in period two protracted transitions when institutions are largely autonomous on paper, but actor compliance is still not a given, this method may be applicable in considering political rulings where plausible judges' incentives may be inferred.
Anecdotal evidence suggests at least the relevance of these findings to other cases; and as more sophisticated data are collected, further research may extrapolate the four ideal types of electoral court failure to other countries' electoral courts, and, perhaps, consider relations between electoral commissions and electoral courts in other "fourth power" electoral justice systems. This microanalytical approach to the "supply side" of electoral justice verdicts, combined with promising efforts by specialists to present more nuanced accounts of political parties, civil society, and international monitors on the "demand side" of electoral justice (Hartlyn, 2000; Schedler 2000; Schmidt, 2000) , may open up sophisticated windows to the political bargaining that underlies apparently rote procedures. Recent post-electoral disputes in non-"fourth power" regimes also indicate a need for the systematic study of legislative-judicial relations over electoral disputes in these democracies. 
